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Talk:Metaphysical objectivism

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I'monly a Philosophy undergrad, but is metaphysical objectivism really an epistomological theory?


Epistemology deals with the nature and workings of knowledge, so yes. I would hope that a college philosophy student could take the time to spell "epistemological" right. -Micah

I, Martin, am the author (U129960) of the corresponding h2g2 text.

Pmurray bigpond.com 03:53, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)

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Another difficulty with objectivism in probability is the monty hall problem.

Probability section

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I'm not sure I understand what the probability section is trying to claim objectivists believe. There is an actual probability that exists whether we know about it or not, but the only way for us to determine that probability is by obtaining more information. In the case of the numbers on the head, the number is already written on the person's head, so the actual probability is 0 or 1, and would be the value calculated by someone with enough information. The person however, does not have enough information, and so can only calculate the probability 1/2. This does not change the fact that the probability will be 0 or 1 for someone with enough information. A better way of looking at it is: all (non-quantum) probabilities are either 0 or 1 -- we just suck at calculating probabilities. --brian0918™ 04:41, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Think about it in terms of classical motion. If you know the equations of motion exactly, and the initial conditions exactly, then you can determine the position of an object at any time. So, the actual probability of the object being at position X at time T is 0 or 1 based on your equations. All this is saying is that equations work. The problem comes when trying to determine the initial conditions, and the equations of motion. Without all the information, we can't bring that probability all the way to 1 or 0. --brian0918™ 04:49, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)

This discussion of probability may not belong here but rather in a different field of the natural sciences & philosophy, more specifically in the discussion of determinism. Determinism--the belief that all physical events are causally determined by events prior and that no totally random events ever occur--is relevant to objectivism in that if the universe is deterministic it must indeed be objective as well, as every event is a predictable consequence.

NB: "deterministic" does not imply "predictable" - at least for non-omnipotent beings. see Chaos theory and the internet encyclopedia of philosophy for more info. In short: some mathematical systems are highly dependant on initial conditions (think of two bits of confetti on the ocean). In order to predict such systems one would need either an impossible degree of accuracy (Heisenberg uncertainty principle) or more energy than is believed to exist in the universe (Physics of computation).

This section definitely needs some rephrasing if it is going to stay in this article. I will attempt to clarify... (Micah, June 28 2005) I changed the section to make sense in terms of objectivism.

If a tree falls in the forest, but no one is present to hear it, does it make a sound?

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What does "sound" mean? If it means vibrations in the air, then yes, the tree does make a sound. If it means the subjective experience caused by those vibrations then no, it doesn't - someone needs to be present for there to be a sound.

Nitpicking, I know, but I don't think an objectivist would necessarily answer "yes" to this question.

MikePlayle 17:44, 11 August 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You're correct. I've removed the example. Chiok 01:59, 4 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Moved to objectivism (metaphysics)

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The only other philosophy refering to "objectivism" which is not this one is Ayn Rand's philosophy, a writer who i had never heard of before. Objectivism (metaphysics) is therefore a lot better name for the entry. Regards Lapaz