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Ernle Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield

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Admiral of the Fleet The Right Honourable
The Lord Chatfield
GCB OM KCMG CVO PC DL
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ernle Chatfield
Minister for Coordination of Defence
In office
29 January 1939 – 10 May 1940
Prime MinisterNeville Chamberlain
Preceded bySir Thomas Inskip
Succeeded byWinston Churchill as Minister of Defence
Personal details
Born(1873-09-27)27 September 1873
Southsea, Hampshire
Died15 November 1967(1967-11-15) (aged 94)
Farnham Common, Buckinghamshire
Military service
AllegianceUnited Kingdom
Branch/serviceRoyal Navy
Years of service1886–1938
RankAdmiral of the Fleet
CommandsFirst Sea Lord
Mediterranean Fleet
Atlantic Fleet
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
HMS Queen Elizabeth
HMS Iron Duke
HMS Lion
HMS Southampton
HMS Aboukir
RMS Medina
HMS London
HMS Albemarle
Battles/warsFirst World War
AwardsKnight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath
Member of the Order of Merit
Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
Commander of the Royal Victorian Order

Admiral of the Fleet Alfred Ernle Montacute Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield, GCB, OM, KCMG, CVO, PC, DL (27 September 1873 – 15 November 1967) was a Royal Navy officer. During the First World War he was present as Sir David Beatty's Flag-Captain at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914, at the Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915 and at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916. After the war he became Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet and then Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet before serving as First Sea Lord in the mid-1930s in which role he won arguments that the Royal Navy should have 70 cruisers rather than the 50 cruisers that had been agreed at the Naval Conference of 1930, that the battleship still had an important role to play despite the development of the bomber and that the Fleet Air Arm should be part of the Royal Navy rather than the Royal Air Force. He subsequently served as Minister for Coordination of Defence in the early years of the Second World War.

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Early naval career

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Born the only son of Admiral Alfred John Chatfield and Louisa Chatfield (née Faulconer), Chatfield was educated at St Andrew's School in Tenby before he entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in the training ship HMS Britannia in 1886.[1] He went to sea as a midshipman in the corvette HMS Cleopatra in November 1888 before transferring to the cruiser HMS Warspite, flagship of the Pacific Station, in 1890.[1] Promoted to sub-lieutenant on 27 September 1892[2] and to lieutenant on 27 March 1894, he joined the battleship HMS Royal Sovereign, flagship of the Channel Fleet in May 1894.[1] He attended the gunnery school HMS Excellent in 1895 and then joined the staff at the gunnery school HMS Cambridge at Devonport in August 1897.[1] Chatfield became gunnery officer in the battleship HMS Caesar in the Mediterranean Fleet in January 1899 and then joined the staff of the gunnery school HMS Wildfire at Sheerness in January 1900 before becoming 1st lieutenant and gunnery officer in the cruiser HMS Good Hope in the Atlantic Fleet in November 1902.[3][1] Promoted to commander on 1 January 1904,[4] he transferred to the battleship HMS Venerable in the Mediterranean Fleet in January 1904.[1]

He returned to HMS Excellent in March 1906 and, having been promoted to captain on 30 June 1909, he became Flag Captain of the battleship HMS Albemarle, flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Colin Keppel, second-in-command of the Atlantic Fleet, in September 1909 and then Flag Captain of the battleship HMS London, Keppel's new flagship in the same role, in February 1910.[5] After attending the War course at the Royal Naval War College at Portsmouth, he served as Captain of the converted liner RMS Medina for the Royal Tour of India in 1911[5] and was appointed to the Royal Victorian Order as a Commander in February 1912.[6] He was then given command first of HMS Aboukir in the Reserve Fleet in Summer 1912, then of the cruiser HMS Southampton in September 1912 and subsequently of the battlecruiser HMS Lion, flagship of Rear-Admiral David Beatty's First Battlecruiser Squadron, in March 1913.[5]

First World War

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The battle cruiser HMS Lion, which Chatfield commanded at the Battle of Jutland

During the First World War Chatfield was present as Beatty's Flag-Captain in the Lion at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914, at the Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915 and at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916.[5] It was at Jutland, after two British battlecruisers had blown up, that Beatty made his famous remark, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today".[7][8] Appointed to the Order of St Michael and St George as a Companion on 31 May 1916[9] and to the Order of the Bath as a Companion in the 1916 Birthday Honours,[10] Chatfield went on to command the battleship HMS Iron Duke, Beatty's flagship as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, in November 1916 and then the battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, Beatty's new flagship in the same role, in February 1917.[5] He was advanced to Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George on 5 April 1919.[11]

Senior command

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After the war Chatfield served as Fourth Sea Lord from July 1919 and, having been appointed Naval Aide-de-Camp to the King on 26 January 1920[12] and promoted to rear-admiral on 31 July 1920,[13] he became Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff in February 1920.[5] Advanced to Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in the 1922 Birthday Honours,[14] he was appointed Commander of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in September 1922 and Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy in April 1925.[5] Promoted to vice-admiral on 1 March 1926,[15] he went on to be Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, with his flag in the battleship HMS Nelson, in March 1929 and, having been promoted to full admiral on 1 April 1930,[16] he became Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, with his flag in the battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, in May 1930.[17] Chatfield became First Sea Lord in January 1933[17] and was advanced to Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in the 1934 New Year Honours.[18] As First Sea Lord he won arguments that the Royal Navy should have 70 cruisers rather than the 50 cruisers that had been agreed at the London Naval Conference 1930, that the battleship still had an important role to play despite the development of the bomber and that the Fleet Air Arm should be part of the Royal Navy rather than the Royal Air Force.[19]

In debates with Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Treasury, who reached an understanding with Japan, Chatfield spoke in favor of reaching an understanding with the United States.[20] Chatfield argued that the Imperial Japanese Navy was the powerful naval force in Asia; that Japan was becoming increasingly unfriendly towards Great Britain; that Hong Kong was dangerously exposed and the Singapore naval base was far from being completed despite having work having been started in 1919; and that for all these reasons that having the United States Navy as an ally in the Asia-Pacific region would be of immense strategical benefit.[20] Chatfield's arguments tended to win out over those of Fisher, who usually had nothing more than visceral anti-Americanism to base his arguments on.[20] For his first two years as First Sea Lord, Chatfield was hamstrung by awaiting the result of the 1935 Naval Disarmament conference as he could not place any orders for warships until he knew what the results of the conference would be.[20] As First Sea Lord, Chatfield had a marked tendency to play up the threat from Japan when addressing the Defense Requirements Committee in 1933-1934, which had the task of planning British rearmament for the next five years.[21] The Defense Requirements Sub-Committee was chaired by Maurice Hankey and consisted of Chatfield plus the other two service chiefs, namely Air Chief Marshal Edward Ellington and Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd along with Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office and Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury.[22]

For Chatfield, a war with Japan offered up the prospect of fleet battles in Asian waters, which in turn would require more funding for the Royal Navy to build the necessary warships to confront the Japanese Navy along with building and maintaining the bases to properly supply the fleet if the Singapore strategy were activated.[21] During the meetings of the Defense sub-committee, Chatfield stated the first concern should be Japan and he favored having the Singapore base finished along with building defenses to defend Singapore.[23] Chatfield argued that the Singapore strategy was not only the best way to deter Japan, but also offered up the prospect of an alliance with the United States.[23] He pointed out that the United States Navy was building a new naval base in Hawaii at Pearl Harbour, which took as a sign that the United States was also concerned about Japan, and argued that joint Anglo-American fears of Japanese expansionism could serve as the basis of an Anglo-American alliance.[23] Chatfield's efforts for a larger naval budget was undercut by a series of highly alarmist stories in the British newspapers about the power of strategical bombing to inflict a "knock-out blow" within a matter of days by razing entire cities, and along with the claim that the Luftwaffe possessed such a bomber force.[21] The hysterical claims about the Luftwaffe, which vastly exaggerated the war-winning capacity of strategical bombing, which were shared by the Lord Privy Seal, Stanley Baldwin, ensured that the Royal Air Force received the lion's share of the rearmament budget.[24] The report of the Defense Requirements Commitment submitted to the cabinet in February 1934 called Germany "the ultimate potential enemy" against which British rearmament was to be directed against.[25] However, in terms of recommendations the report in many ways favored Chatfield such as in it's call to finally finish the Singapore base and to strengthen British bases in Asia in general.[25]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, protested that the costs of a naval arms race with Japan; sending another large expeditionary force to aid France; and building up a strong RAF would be too much of a financial strain and that choices had to be made.[26] Chamberlain argued that since Germany was by far the most powerful of Britain's potential enemies, the conclusion that Germany was "the ultimate potential enemy" should be strictly adhered to with regard to defense spending.[26] As such, Chamberlain ruled that of the £76.8 million committed for defense spending in the coming fiscal year, £50.3 million was to go to the Royal Air Force.[27] Chamberlain downplayed Chatfield's thesis of a Japanese threat under the grounds that Japan could threaten Australia, New Zealand and the British colonies in Asia while Germany could threaten the United Kingdom itself.[27] Chamberlain concluded in a paper to the cabinet: "Our best defense would be the existence of a deterrent force so powerful as to render success in attack too doubtful to be worthwhile. I submit that this is most likely to be attained by the establishment of an air force based in this country of a size and efficiency calculated to inspire respect in the mind of a possible enemy".[27] As part of an effort to sabotage Chatfield's case, Chamberlain ruled that no new warships were to be ordered until the 1935 naval conference was held, and in the defense estimates submitted to the House of Commons in 1934, the Army's budget was cut in half, the RAF's budget was raised and the Royal Navy's budget stayed about the same.[28] The defense policy adopted in 1934 came to be known as "limited liability" with the thesis that Britain was an island that ruled a global empire and as such spending on air power and sea power was emphasised.[29] Through Chatfield would preferred greater naval spending, he did not oppose the basic assumptions of the limited liability doctrine, and he tended to favor the defense of the British empire and the Commonwealth over the defense of other states that might be threatened with aggression.[29]

In 1935, Italy made open preparations to invade Ethiopia, which was a member of the League of Nations.[30] As Baldwin had made a point of running on a platform on emphasising support for the League of Nations and collective security in the general election of that year, it was expected that Britain would have to take some sort of action if Italy invaded. Chatfield reported that if the League of Nations imposed oil sanctions on Italy, it would cause an Italian economic collapse as Italy had no oil of its own, and would probably provoke Benito Mussolini into a desperate "mad dog" attack on Britain.[30] However Chatfield reported it might be worth going to war with Italy because it offered a chance to "reassert our dominance over an inferior race".[31]

He was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 3 May 1935[32] and, having taken part in the funeral of King George V in January 1936[33] and the coronation of King George VI in May 1937,[34] he was raised to the peerage as Baron Chatfield of Ditchling in the County of Sussex on 11 June 1937.[35] He retired from the Royal Navy in August 1938.[19]

In late 1938 Chatfield chaired the Expert Committee on the Defence of India which, using the work of the 1938 Auchinleck Committee, recommended that the arena of India's defence should be re-focussed more on her sea communications and less on her North-Western Land Frontier as well as the modernisation of the British Indian Army, the re-equipment of the RAF squadrons and the re-stocking of war stores.[36]

Minister for Coordination of Defence

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Victor Weisz's caricature of Chatfield

Having been appointed to the Order of Merit in the 1939 New Year Honours,[37][38] in February Chatfield succeeded Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for Coordination of Defence in the government of Neville Chamberlain, despite having a non-political background.[19] He was sworn of the Privy Council at the same time.[39]

In March 1939 Chatfield urged an increase in munition production: "Would it not be possible to put industry on a war production basis immediately, not necessarily at the expense of our export trade but by curtailing internal consumption?" However the President of the Board of Trade, Oliver Stanley, objected: "Such a step would be almost revolutionary, and must be proved absolutely essential before introduction".[40]

On 11 April 1939 the Foreign Policy Committee decided that the question of Russia's potential as an ally should be referred to the Chiefs of Staff. Chatfield said that it was clear the political arguments against a Russian alliance outweighed any possible military benefits and that the Chiefs of Staff should only report on Russia's military capability.[41] On 24 April 1939 the Chiefs of Staff submitted their report and rated Russia's military effectiveness low. The next day Chatfield gave the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy a summary of this report: "Russia, although a great Power for other purposes, was only a Power of medium rank for military purposes...Her assistance would be of considerable, though not of great, military value".[42] On 16 May 1939 Lord Halifax said that the political reasons for not allying with Russia were stronger than the strategic reasons for such an alliance. Chatfield responded: "...if for fear of making an alliance with Russia we drove that country into the German camp we should have made a mistake of vital and far-reaching importance".[43]

Chatfield resigned as Minister for Coordination of Defence in April 1940 and subsequently chaired a committee on the evacuation of London's hospitals.[44] He retired to his home at Farnham Common in Buckinghamshire and became Deputy Lieutenant of that county on 15 June 1951.[45] He died at his home there on 15 November 1967.[44]

Family

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In July 1909 he married Lillian Emma Matthews (d.1977); they had two daughters and a son.[5] Their son, Ernle, succeeded his father as Baron Chatfield. He followed him into the Royal Navy, serving as Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of Canada between 1940 and 1945. The 2nd Baron settled in Victoria, British Columbia. Their elder daughter, Angela (Lady Donner) married Sir Patrick Donner MP. Their younger daughter, Katharine, married Henry Duckworth, son of Sir George Duckworth.[46]

Arms

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Coat of arms of Ernle Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield
Crest
An heraldic antelope’s head erased Argent gorged with a naval crown Or.
Escutcheon
Or a griffin segreant Sable on a chief Purpure an anchor between escallops of the first.
Supporters
On the dexter side an Admiralty Messenger holding in the exterior hand his staff and on the sinister side a gunner of the Royal Navy resting the exterior hand on a shell all Proper.
Motto
Pro Aris Et Focis [47]

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f Heathcote, p. 40
  2. ^ "No. 26508". The London Gazette. 1 May 1894. p. 2510.
  3. ^ "Naval & Military intelligence". The Times. No. 36858. London. 28 August 1902. p. 4.
  4. ^ "No. 27632". The London Gazette. 1 January 1904. p. 26.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h Heathcote, p. 41
  6. ^ "No. 12434". The Edinburgh Gazette. 16 February 1912. p. 156.
  7. ^ Wragg, pp. 83–93
  8. ^ Mordal, p. 281.
  9. ^ "No. 29751". The London Gazette (Supplement). 15 September 1916. p. 9071.
  10. ^ "No. 29608". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 June 1916. p. 5553.
  11. ^ "No. 31274". The London Gazette (Supplement). 4 April 1919. p. 4516.
  12. ^ "No. 31791". The London Gazette (Supplement). 24 February 1920. p. 2189.
  13. ^ "No. 32017". The London Gazette. 13 August 1920. p. 8408.
  14. ^ "No. 32716". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 June 1922. p. 4321.
  15. ^ "No. 33139". The London Gazette. 5 March 1926. p. 1650.
  16. ^ "No. 33596". The London Gazette. 11 April 1930. p. 2327.
  17. ^ a b Heathcote, p. 42
  18. ^ "No. 34010". The London Gazette (Supplement). 29 December 1933. p. 3.
  19. ^ a b c Heathcote, p. 43
  20. ^ a b c d Kennedy 2013, p. 124.
  21. ^ a b c Maiolo 2010, p. 98.
  22. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 97.
  23. ^ a b c Kennedy 2009, p. 37.
  24. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 98-100.
  25. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 99.
  26. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 100.
  27. ^ a b c Maiolo 2010, p. 101.
  28. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 101-102.
  29. ^ a b Stedman 2009, p. 92.
  30. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 73.
  31. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 73-74.
  32. ^ "No. 34159". The London Gazette. 10 May 1935. p. 3048.
  33. ^ "No. 34279". The London Gazette (Supplement). 29 April 1936. p. 2782.
  34. ^ "No. 34453". The London Gazette (Supplement). 10 November 1937. p. 7081.
  35. ^ "No. 34408". The London Gazette. 15 June 1937. p. 3856.
  36. ^ Kavic, p. 232
  37. ^ "No. 34585". The London Gazette (Supplement). 30 December 1938. p. 4.
  38. ^ "No. 15559". The Edinburgh Gazette. 6 January 1939. p. 13.
  39. ^ "No. 34595". The London Gazette. 3 February 1939. p. 751.
  40. ^ Barnett, p. 558
  41. ^ Barnett, p. 562.
  42. ^ Barnett, p. 565.
  43. ^ Barnett, p. 566.
  44. ^ a b Heathcote, p. 44
  45. ^ "No. 39267". The London Gazette. 22 June 1951. p. 3430.
  46. ^ Mosley, Charles, editor. Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th edition, 3 volumes. Wilmington, Delaware, U.S.A.: Burke's Peerage (Genealogical Books) Ltd, 2003.
  47. ^ Burke's Peerage. 1949.

Sources

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  • Barnett, Correlli (2002). The Collapse of British Power. Pan. ISBN 978-0571281695.
  • Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 – 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd. ISBN 0-85052-835-6.
  • Kavic, Lorne (1967). India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965. California University Press. ASIN B0000CNPVE.
  • Kennedy, Greg (2009). "Symbol of Imperial Defense: The Role of Singapore in British and American Far Eastern Strategical Relations, 1933-1941". In Brian Ferrel (ed.). A Great Betrayal The Fall of Singapore Revisited. London: Marshall Cavendish. pp. 32–52. ISBN 9789814435468.
  • Kennedy, Greg (2013). Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939 Imperial Crossroads. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781136340086.
  • Maiolo, Joseph (2010). Cry Havoc How the Arms Race Drove the World to War, 1931-1941. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 9780465022670.
  • Mordal, Jacques (1974). 25 Centuries of Sea Warfare. Futura. ISBN 978-1299679412.*
  • Stedman, Andrew (2009). ""Then What could Chamberlain do other than what Chamberlain?": the enduring need for a more nuanced understanding of British policy and alternatives to appeasement". In Gaynor Johnson (ed.). The International Context of the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publisher. pp. 87–116. ISBN 9781443809436.
  • Wragg, David (2006). Royal Navy Handbook 1914–1918. Sutton. ISBN 978-0750942034.

Further reading

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  • Chatfield, Ernle (1942). The Navy and Defence. Heinemann. ASIN B0006APX92.
  • Chatfield, Ernle (1947). It Might Happen Again. Heinemann. ASIN B006P025WA.
  • Murfett, Malcolm (1995). The First Sea Lords from Fisher to Mountbatten. Westport. ISBN 0-275-94231-7.
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Wikimedia Commons has media related to Ernle Chatfield.
Military offices
Preceded by Fourth Sea Lord
1919–1920 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy
1925–1928 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
1929–1930 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet
1930–1932 		Succeeded by
First Sea Lord
1933–1938 		Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded by Minister for Coordination of Defence
1939–1940 		Office abolished
Peerage of the United Kingdom
New creation Baron Chatfield
1937–1967 		Succeeded by
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