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Ernle Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield

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Admiral of the Fleet The Right Honourable
The Lord Chatfield
GCB OM KCMG CVO PC DL
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ernle Chatfield
Minister for Coordination of Defence
In office
29 January 1939 – 10 May 1940
Prime MinisterNeville Chamberlain
Preceded bySir Thomas Inskip
Succeeded byWinston Churchill as Minister of Defence
Personal details
Born(1873-09-27)27 September 1873
Southsea, Hampshire
Died15 November 1967(1967-11-15) (aged 94)
Farnham Common, Buckinghamshire
Military service
AllegianceUnited Kingdom
Branch/serviceRoyal Navy
Years of service1886–1938
RankAdmiral of the Fleet
CommandsFirst Sea Lord
Mediterranean Fleet
Atlantic Fleet
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
HMS Queen Elizabeth
HMS Iron Duke
HMS Lion
HMS Southampton
HMS Aboukir
RMS Medina
HMS London
HMS Albemarle
Battles/warsFirst World War
AwardsKnight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath
Member of the Order of Merit
Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
Commander of the Royal Victorian Order

Admiral of the Fleet Alfred Ernle Montacute Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield, GCB, OM, KCMG, CVO, PC, DL (27 September 1873 – 15 November 1967) was a Royal Navy officer. During the First World War he was present as Sir David Beatty's Flag-Captain at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914, at the Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915 and at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916. After the war he became Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet and then Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet before serving as First Sea Lord in the mid-1930s in which role he won arguments that the Royal Navy should have 70 cruisers rather than the 50 cruisers that had been agreed at the Naval Conference of 1930, that the battleship still had an important role to play despite the development of the bomber and that the Fleet Air Arm should be part of the Royal Navy rather than the Royal Air Force. He subsequently served as Minister for Coordination of Defence in the early years of the Second World War.

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Early naval career

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Born the only son of Admiral Alfred John Chatfield and Louisa Chatfield (née Faulconer), Chatfield was educated at St Andrew's School in Tenby before he entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in the training ship HMS Britannia in 1886.[1] He went to sea as a midshipman in the corvette HMS Cleopatra in November 1888 before transferring to the cruiser HMS Warspite, flagship of the Pacific Station, in 1890.[1] Promoted to sub-lieutenant on 27 September 1892[2] and to lieutenant on 27 March 1894, he joined the battleship HMS Royal Sovereign, flagship of the Channel Fleet in May 1894.[1] He attended the gunnery school HMS Excellent in 1895 and then joined the staff at the gunnery school HMS Cambridge at Devonport in August 1897.[1] Chatfield became gunnery officer in the battleship HMS Caesar in the Mediterranean Fleet in January 1899 and then joined the staff of the gunnery school HMS Wildfire at Sheerness in January 1900 before becoming 1st lieutenant and gunnery officer in the cruiser HMS Good Hope in the Atlantic Fleet in November 1902.[3][1] Promoted to commander on 1 January 1904,[4] he transferred to the battleship HMS Venerable in the Mediterranean Fleet in January 1904.[1]

He returned to HMS Excellent in March 1906 and, having been promoted to captain on 30 June 1909, he became Flag Captain of the battleship HMS Albemarle, flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Colin Keppel, second-in-command of the Atlantic Fleet, in September 1909 and then Flag Captain of the battleship HMS London, Keppel's new flagship in the same role, in February 1910.[5] After attending the War course at the Royal Naval War College at Portsmouth, he served as Captain of the converted liner RMS Medina for the Royal Tour of India in 1911[5] and was appointed to the Royal Victorian Order as a Commander in February 1912.[6] He was then given command first of HMS Aboukir in the Reserve Fleet in Summer 1912, then of the cruiser HMS Southampton in September 1912 and subsequently of the battlecruiser HMS Lion, flagship of Rear-Admiral David Beatty's First Battlecruiser Squadron, in March 1913.[5]

First World War

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The battle cruiser HMS Lion, which Chatfield commanded at the Battle of Jutland

During the First World War Chatfield was present as Beatty's Flag-Captain in the Lion at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914, at the Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915 and at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916.[5] It was at Jutland, after two British battlecruisers had blown up, that Beatty made his famous remark, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today".[7][8] Appointed to the Order of St Michael and St George as a Companion on 31 May 1916[9] and to the Order of the Bath as a Companion in the 1916 Birthday Honours,[10] Chatfield went on to command the battleship HMS Iron Duke, Beatty's flagship as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, in November 1916 and then the battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, Beatty's new flagship in the same role, in February 1917.[5] He was advanced to Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George on 5 April 1919.[11]

Senior command

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After the war Chatfield served as Fourth Sea Lord from July 1919 and, having been appointed Naval Aide-de-Camp to the King on 26 January 1920[12] and promoted to rear-admiral on 31 July 1920,[13] he became Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff in February 1920.[5] Advanced to Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in the 1922 Birthday Honours,[14] he was appointed Commander of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in September 1922 and Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy in April 1925.[5] Promoted to vice-admiral on 1 March 1926,[15] he went on to be Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, with his flag in the battleship HMS Nelson, in March 1929 and, having been promoted to full admiral on 1 April 1930,[16] he became Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, with his flag in the battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, in May 1930.[17] Chatfield became First Sea Lord in January 1933[17] and was advanced to Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in the 1934 New Year Honours.[18] As First Sea Lord he won arguments that the Royal Navy should have 70 cruisers rather than the 50 cruisers that had been agreed at the London Naval Conference 1930, that the battleship still had an important role to play despite the development of the bomber and that the Fleet Air Arm should be part of the Royal Navy rather than the Royal Air Force.[19]

In debates with Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Treasury, who reached an understanding with Japan, Chatfield spoke in favor of reaching an understanding with the United States.[20] Chatfield argued that the Imperial Japanese Navy was the powerful naval force in Asia; that Japan was becoming increasingly unfriendly towards Great Britain; that Hong Kong was dangerously exposed and the Singapore naval base was far from being completed despite having work having been started in 1919; and that for all these reasons that having the United States Navy as an ally in the Asia-Pacific region would be of immense strategical benefit.[20] Chatfield's arguments tended to win out over those of Fisher, who usually had nothing more than visceral anti-Americanism to base his arguments on.[20] For his first two years as First Sea Lord, Chatfield was hamstrung by awaiting the result of the 1935 Naval Disarmament conference as he could not place any orders for warships until he knew what the results of the conference would be.[20] As First Sea Lord, Chatfield had a marked tendency to play up the threat from Japan when addressing the Defense Requirements Committee in 1933-1934, which had the task of planning British rearmament for the next five years.[21] The Defense Requirements Sub-Committee was chaired by Maurice Hankey and consisted of Chatfield plus the other two service chiefs, namely Air Chief Marshal Edward Ellington and Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd along with Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office and Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury.[22]

For Chatfield, a war with Japan offered up the prospect of fleet battles in Asian waters, which in turn would require more funding for the Royal Navy to build the necessary warships to confront the Japanese Navy along with building and maintaining the bases to properly supply the fleet if the Singapore strategy were activated.[21] During the meetings of the Defense sub-committee, Chatfield stated the first concern should be Japan and he favored having the Singapore base finished along with building defenses to defend Singapore.[23] Chatfield argued that the Singapore strategy was not only the best way to deter Japan, but also offered up the prospect of an alliance with the United States.[23] He pointed out that the United States Navy was building a new naval base in Hawaii at Pearl Harbour, which took as a sign that the United States was also concerned about Japan, and argued that joint Anglo-American fears of Japanese expansionism could serve as the basis of an Anglo-American alliance.[23] Chatfield's efforts for a larger naval budget was undercut by a series of highly alarmist stories in the British newspapers about the power of strategical bombing to inflict a "knock-out blow" within a matter of days by razing entire cities, and along with the claim that the Luftwaffe possessed such a bomber force.[21] The hysterical claims about the Luftwaffe, which vastly exaggerated the war-winning capacity of strategical bombing, which were shared by the Lord Privy Seal, Stanley Baldwin, ensured that the Royal Air Force received the lion's share of the rearmament budget.[24] The report of the Defense Requirements Commitment submitted to the cabinet in February 1934 called Germany "the ultimate potential enemy" against which British rearmament was to be directed against.[25] However, in terms of recommendations the report in many ways favored Chatfield such as in it's call to finally finish the Singapore base and to strengthen British bases in Asia in general.[25]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, protested that the costs of a naval arms race with Japan; sending another large expeditionary force to aid France; and building up a strong RAF would be too much of a financial strain and that choices had to be made.[26] Chamberlain argued that since Germany was by far the most powerful of Britain's potential enemies, the conclusion that Germany was "the ultimate potential enemy" should be strictly adhered to with regard to defense spending.[26] As such, Chamberlain ruled that of the £76.8 million committed for defense spending in the coming fiscal year, £50.3 million was to go to the Royal Air Force.[27] Chamberlain downplayed Chatfield's thesis of a Japanese threat under the grounds that Japan could threaten Australia, New Zealand and the British colonies in Asia while Germany could threaten the United Kingdom itself.[27] Chamberlain concluded in a paper to the cabinet: "Our best defense would be the existence of a deterrent force so powerful as to render success in attack too doubtful to be worthwhile. I submit that this is most likely to be attained by the establishment of an air force based in this country of a size and efficiency calculated to inspire respect in the mind of a possible enemy".[27] As part of an effort to sabotage Chatfield's case, Chamberlain ruled that no new warships were to be ordered until the 1935 naval conference was held, and in the defense estimates submitted to the House of Commons in 1934, the Army's budget was cut in half, the RAF's budget was raised and the Royal Navy's budget stayed about the same.[28] The defense policy adopted in 1934 came to be known as "limited liability" with the thesis that Britain was an island that ruled a global empire and as such spending on air power and sea power was emphasised.[29] Through Chatfield would preferred greater naval spending, he did not oppose the basic assumptions of the limited liability doctrine, and he tended to favor the defense of the British empire and the Commonwealth over the defense of other states that might be threatened with aggression.[29]

In 1935, Italy made open preparations to invade Ethiopia, which was a member of the League of Nations.[30] As Baldwin had made a point of running on a platform on emphasising support for the League of Nations and collective security in the general election of that year, it was expected that Britain would have to take some sort of action if Italy invaded. Chatfield reported that if the League of Nations imposed oil sanctions on Italy, it would cause an Italian economic collapse as Italy had no oil of its own, and would probably provoke Benito Mussolini into a desperate "mad dog" attack on Britain.[30] However Chatfield reported it might be worth going to war with Italy because it offered a chance to "reassert our dominance over an inferior race".[31] During the Abyssinia crisis, Chatfield was regarded as the senior service chief whose advice Baldwin (who knew nothing of military affairs) generally followed[32] The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, tended to follow Chatfield's advice, being more of a representative of the Admiralty in the cabinet rather than it's master.[33]

Chatfield reported to the cabinet that 76% of all imports to Italy came via the sea with 62% of all Italian imports coming from the Atlantic ocean via the Strait of Gibraltar, 3% of Italian imports via the Suez canal, and the other 11% coming from other Mediterranean nations or the from nations bordering the Black Sea.[34] Chatfield in a memo to the cabinet on 3 September 1935 wrote: "With our forces based in Gibraltar and in Egypt, her main communications can be cut with comparatively little effort to ourselves, whereas to take any steps (excepting by submarine) to counter our action she would have to send her forces far from their bases where they would be brought to action. This strategical advantage is so great that it is highly unlikely that Italy could make any serious effort with naval forces to interfere with our control of the two exits to the Mediterranean except by action of her submarines, which could not prove to be decisive. Further, Italy's objective is the prosecution of her Abyssinian war, and the mere closing of the [Suez] canal to her by the presence of our naval forces (whether the closing is done in the canal itself or by action outside of it) might be decisive within a measurable period".[34] Chatfield admitted that if Britain did go to war with Italy, it might led to the Regina Marina temporarily taking control of the central Mediterranean, which in effect would be the same time as severing the Suez canal, but he did not expect this advantage to last as he had low opinion of the Italian admirals, whom he noted were promoted on the basis of loyalty to the House of Savoy rather than merit, which was the case with the Royal Navy.[34]

Despite his bluster, Chatfield advised caution as the Royal Navy had only 15 capital ships in 1935 (down from the 100 capital ships in 1914), and even the loss of a few capital ships could be devastating as a single battleship cost millions of pounds to build and took several years to complete.[32] In a memo to the Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, Chatfield wrote: "we must never forgot that we have no naval margin at all, and the loss of one or two ships would be a serious matter for us".[35] In a memo to Fisher on 25 August 1935, Chatfield wrote: "...that a hostile Italy is a real menace to our Imperial communications and defense system. We have relied on practically abandoning the Mediterranean if we send our fleet east. For that reason, I do not want to go to extreme measures and hope the Geneva pacifists will fail to get unanimity and the League will break up".[36] Chatfield stated that a war with Italy would likely lead to several British warships being sunk, which would take several years to replace, and would undermine the Singapore strategy.[36] Through Chatfield expressed much confidence that the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet was capable of defeating the Regia Marina, in a memo to Vansittart, he wrote: "I was surprised to find how unready the other two services were and how long it would take before they could give effective resistance to Italian action by land or air. The naval situation is bad enough....it would be a serious business if the great League of Nations, having at last agreed to act together, was able to be flouted by the nation it was trying to coerce".[37] Chatfield advised against imposing oil sanctions on Italy, saying that a war with Italy was not worth the cost.[38]

In particular, Chatfield stated it was unclear if France would also join in a war against Italy, saying the support of France would be essential.[39] Chatfield stated that the main British base in the Mediterranean in Malta was too exposed to Italian air and naval attacks, and could not be used.[39] As for the other British bases in the Mediterranean, there were no docks for capital ships at Gibraltar and at the base in Alexandria the docks were only big enough for light cruisers and destroyers.[40] For this reason, Chatfield stated it was imperative that the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet have permission to use the docks for capital ships at the French Mediterranean fleet's bases at Toulon and Bizerta, and as such it was crucial that Britain have the support of France in confronting Italy.[40] The French Premier, Pierre Laval, was committed to achieving a Franco-Italian alliance, and through he pleaded support to the League of Nations, he did so in a manner that suggested grudging, half-hearted support.[40] On 30 October 1935 in a meeting in London, Rear Admiral Jean Decoux of the French Naval General Staff promised Chatfield that France would also go to war if Britain went to war against Italy, though Decoux admitted that it would take several weeks before the Marine would be able to commerce operations against the Regia Marina.[41] Decoux sheepishly admitted to Chatfield that the level of competence in the French Navy was so low that it would take at least three or four weeks after war was declared before the French Mediterranean fleet would be ready for operations.[41] Chatfield was less interested in having the Marine join the proposed war than the offer that the British Mediterranean fleet could use the bases at Toulon and Bizerta for docking and repairs.[41] The Chatfield-Decoux talks ended with the agreement that in the event of war, the French Mediterranean fleet would patrol the western Mediterranean while the British Mediterranean fleet would patrol the eastern Mediterranean.[42] Ultimately, Baldwin and his cabinet chose not to go to war for the sake of Ethiopia as the cabinet wished to prevent a break-up of the Stresa Front and because no-one in the cabinet really cared about Ethiopia.[43]

He was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 3 May 1935[44] and, having taken part in the funeral of King George V in January 1936[45] and the coronation of King George VI in May 1937,[46] he was raised to the peerage as Baron Chatfield of Ditchling in the County of Sussex on 11 June 1937.[47] On 12 December 1937, his vision of Anglo-American co-operation was brought much closer to fruition after the Japanese aircraft sank an American gunboat, USS Panay in the Yangtze river despite the Panay clearly flying an American flag and Japanese artillery damaged a British gunboat, HMS Ladybird when the Ladybird tried to pick up survivors from the Panay.[48] In response to the unprovoked Japanese attacks on Anglo-American gunboats in the Yangtze, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had spoken vaguely to Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington, about his wish for a joint Anglo-American blockade of Japan, saying that the Japanese were completely out of control and something would have to be done.[49] In January 1938, Roosevelt dispatched Captain Royal E. Ingersoll of the United States Navy to London to hold secret talks with Chatfield about plans for a war with Japan.[50] The talks were hampered by the fact that both Chamberlain who was now prime minister and Roosevelt had imposed the condition that the purpose of the talks was merely to gather information about the other side's war plans, but Chatfield insisted that the United States and the United Kingdom should co-ordinate their policies in Asia as much as possible as he stated that the two English-speaking nations had common concerns.[50]

Chatfield stated he resisted Chamberlain's attempts to move in piecemeal Royal Navy ships to Singapore and wanted the Singapore strategy activated first before any steps were taken that might risk a war with Japan.[50] Chatfield further told Ingersoll that there should be unity of command with Anglo-American forces in the Asia-Pacific region, but "that as a principle he believed that since the two fleets would probably be separated at first and probably for some time, there could not be unity in command in a tactical or strategical and that strategical co-operation would be all that was possible".[50] Chatfield suggested that there be close intelligence-sharing between the British and American navies along with a common means of communication such a joint cipher.[50] Chatfield soon discovered during the talks that Ingersoll had no real power to negotiate anything, the purpose of his visit was more for information-gathering, and that Roosevelt had wanted the British to take the lead in confronting Japan as the president did not feel that Congress would grant him the necessary authority to go to war.[49] Ingersoll noted that a blockade was an act of war under international law, and Roosevelt would need permission from Congress about imposing a blockade of Japan.[49] Despite these caveats, Chatfield and Ingersoll agreed to a record of conversation that committed both sides to intelligence sharing, a joint cipher, a discussion of war plans, and permission to use each other's waters in Asia-Pacific region (through Chatfield was unable to make any promises on behalf of Australia and New Zealand).[51] The Chatfield-Ingersoll talks did not lead to any action against Japan in 1938 as Roosevelt chose to accept the Japanese claim that the sinking of the Panay was a "mistake", but it marked the beginning of secret Anglo-American naval talks that help draw the United States out of isolationism.[51] He retired from the Royal Navy in August 1938.[19]

In late 1938 Chatfield chaired the Expert Committee on the Defence of India which, using the work of the 1938 Auchinleck Committee, recommended that the arena of India's defence should be re-focussed more on her sea communications and less on her North-Western Land Frontier as well as the modernisation of the British Indian Army, the re-equipment of the RAF squadrons and the re-stocking of war stores.[52]

Minister for Coordination of Defence

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Victor Weisz's caricature of Chatfield

Having been appointed to the Order of Merit in the 1939 New Year Honours,[53][54] in February Chatfield succeeded Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for Coordination of Defence in the government of Neville Chamberlain, despite having a non-political background.[19] He was sworn of the Privy Council at the same time.[55]

In March 1939 Chatfield urged an increase in munition production: "Would it not be possible to put industry on a war production basis immediately, not necessarily at the expense of our export trade but by curtailing internal consumption?" However the President of the Board of Trade, Oliver Stanley, objected: "Such a step would be almost revolutionary, and must be proved absolutely essential before introduction".[56]

On 11 April 1939 the Foreign Policy Committee decided that the question of Russia's potential as an ally should be referred to the Chiefs of Staff. Chatfield said that it was clear the political arguments against a Russian alliance outweighed any possible military benefits and that the Chiefs of Staff should only report on Russia's military capability.[57] On 24 April 1939 the Chiefs of Staff submitted their report and rated Russia's military effectiveness low. The next day Chatfield gave the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy a summary of this report: "Russia, although a great Power for other purposes, was only a Power of medium rank for military purposes...Her assistance would be of considerable, though not of great, military value".[58] On 16 May 1939 Lord Halifax said that the political reasons for not allying with Russia were stronger than the strategic reasons for such an alliance. Chatfield responded: "...if for fear of making an alliance with Russia we drove that country into the German camp we should have made a mistake of vital and far-reaching importance".[59]

Chatfield resigned as Minister for Coordination of Defence in April 1940 and subsequently chaired a committee on the evacuation of London's hospitals.[60] He retired to his home at Farnham Common in Buckinghamshire and became Deputy Lieutenant of that county on 15 June 1951.[61] He died at his home there on 15 November 1967.[60]

Family

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In July 1909 he married Lillian Emma Matthews (d.1977); they had two daughters and a son.[5] Their son, Ernle, succeeded his father as Baron Chatfield. He followed him into the Royal Navy, serving as Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of Canada between 1940 and 1945. The 2nd Baron settled in Victoria, British Columbia. Their elder daughter, Angela (Lady Donner) married Sir Patrick Donner MP. Their younger daughter, Katharine, married Henry Duckworth, son of Sir George Duckworth.[62]

Arms

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Coat of arms of Ernle Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield
Crest
An heraldic antelope’s head erased Argent gorged with a naval crown Or.
Escutcheon
Or a griffin segreant Sable on a chief Purpure an anchor between escallops of the first.
Supporters
On the dexter side an Admiralty Messenger holding in the exterior hand his staff and on the sinister side a gunner of the Royal Navy resting the exterior hand on a shell all Proper.
Motto
Pro Aris Et Focis [63]

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f Heathcote, p. 40
  2. ^ "No. 26508". The London Gazette. 1 May 1894. p. 2510.
  3. ^ "Naval & Military intelligence". The Times. No. 36858. London. 28 August 1902. p. 4.
  4. ^ "No. 27632". The London Gazette. 1 January 1904. p. 26.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h Heathcote, p. 41
  6. ^ "No. 12434". The Edinburgh Gazette. 16 February 1912. p. 156.
  7. ^ Wragg, pp. 83–93
  8. ^ Mordal, p. 281.
  9. ^ "No. 29751". The London Gazette (Supplement). 15 September 1916. p. 9071.
  10. ^ "No. 29608". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 June 1916. p. 5553.
  11. ^ "No. 31274". The London Gazette (Supplement). 4 April 1919. p. 4516.
  12. ^ "No. 31791". The London Gazette (Supplement). 24 February 1920. p. 2189.
  13. ^ "No. 32017". The London Gazette. 13 August 1920. p. 8408.
  14. ^ "No. 32716". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 June 1922. p. 4321.
  15. ^ "No. 33139". The London Gazette. 5 March 1926. p. 1650.
  16. ^ "No. 33596". The London Gazette. 11 April 1930. p. 2327.
  17. ^ a b Heathcote, p. 42
  18. ^ "No. 34010". The London Gazette (Supplement). 29 December 1933. p. 3.
  19. ^ a b c Heathcote, p. 43
  20. ^ a b c d Kennedy 2013, p. 124.
  21. ^ a b c Maiolo 2010, p. 98.
  22. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 97.
  23. ^ a b c Kennedy 2009, p. 37.
  24. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 98-100.
  25. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 99.
  26. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 100.
  27. ^ a b c Maiolo 2010, p. 101.
  28. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 101-102.
  29. ^ a b Stedman 2009, p. 92.
  30. ^ a b Maiolo 2010, p. 73.
  31. ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 73-74.
  32. ^ a b Morewood 2016, p. 77.
  33. ^ Marder 1974, p. 76.
  34. ^ a b c Marder 1974, p. 77.
  35. ^ Morewood 2016, p. 78.
  36. ^ a b Marder 1974, p. 83.
  37. ^ Morewood 2016, p. 79.
  38. ^ Marder 1974, p. 87.
  39. ^ a b Marder 1974, p. 88.
  40. ^ a b c Marder 1974, p. 89.
  41. ^ a b c Marder 1974, p. 90.
  42. ^ Marder 1974, p. 91.
  43. ^ Marder 1974, p. 82.
  44. ^ "No. 34159". The London Gazette. 10 May 1935. p. 3048.
  45. ^ "No. 34279". The London Gazette (Supplement). 29 April 1936. p. 2782.
  46. ^ "No. 34453". The London Gazette (Supplement). 10 November 1937. p. 7081.
  47. ^ "No. 34408". The London Gazette. 15 June 1937. p. 3856.
  48. ^ Johnsen 2016, p. 49.
  49. ^ a b c Johnsen 2016, p. 49-50.
  50. ^ a b c d e Johnsen 2016, p. 50.
  51. ^ a b Johnsen 2016, p. 50-51.
  52. ^ Kavic, p. 232
  53. ^ "No. 34585". The London Gazette (Supplement). 30 December 1938. p. 4.
  54. ^ "No. 15559". The Edinburgh Gazette. 6 January 1939. p. 13.
  55. ^ "No. 34595". The London Gazette. 3 February 1939. p. 751.
  56. ^ Barnett, p. 558
  57. ^ Barnett, p. 562.
  58. ^ Barnett, p. 565.
  59. ^ Barnett, p. 566.
  60. ^ a b Heathcote, p. 44
  61. ^ "No. 39267". The London Gazette. 22 June 1951. p. 3430.
  62. ^ Mosley, Charles, editor. Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th edition, 3 volumes. Wilmington, Delaware, U.S.A.: Burke's Peerage (Genealogical Books) Ltd, 2003.
  63. ^ Burke's Peerage. 1949.

Sources

[edit]
  • Barnett, Correlli (2002). The Collapse of British Power. Pan. ISBN 978-0571281695.
  • Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 – 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd. ISBN 0-85052-835-6.
  • Kavic, Lorne (1967). India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965. California University Press. ASIN B0000CNPVE.
  • Kennedy, Greg (2009). "Symbol of Imperial Defense: The Role of Singapore in British and American Far Eastern Strategical Relations, 1933-1941". In Brian Ferrel (ed.). A Great Betrayal The Fall of Singapore Revisited. London: Marshall Cavendish. pp. 32–52. ISBN 9789814435468.
  • Johnsen, William T. (2016). The Origins of the Grand Alliance Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813168357.
  • Kennedy, Greg (2013). Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939 Imperial Crossroads. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781136340086.
  • Marder, Arthur (1974). From the Dardanelles to Oran Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 9781612519944,. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  • Maiolo, Joseph (2010). Cry Havoc How the Arms Race Drove the World to War, 1931-1941. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 9780465022670.
  • Morewood, Sean (2016). ""This silly African business": the military dimension to Britain's response to the Abyssinian crisis". In G.Bruce Strang (ed.). Collision of Empires Italy's Invasion of Ethiopia and Its International Impact. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 73–108. ISBN 9781317164173.
  • Mordal, Jacques (1974). 25 Centuries of Sea Warfare. Futura. ISBN 978-1299679412.*
  • Stedman, Andrew (2009). ""Then What could Chamberlain do other than what Chamberlain?": the enduring need for a more nuanced understanding of British policy and alternatives to appeasement". In Gaynor Johnson (ed.). The International Context of the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publisher. pp. 87–116. ISBN 9781443809436.
  • Wragg, David (2006). Royal Navy Handbook 1914–1918. Sutton. ISBN 978-0750942034.

Further reading

[edit]
  • Chatfield, Ernle (1942). The Navy and Defence. Heinemann. ASIN B0006APX92.
  • Chatfield, Ernle (1947). It Might Happen Again. Heinemann. ASIN B006P025WA.
  • Murfett, Malcolm (1995). The First Sea Lords from Fisher to Mountbatten. Westport. ISBN 0-275-94231-7.
[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Ernle Chatfield.
Military offices
Preceded by Fourth Sea Lord
1919–1920 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy
1925–1928 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
1929–1930 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet
1930–1932 		Succeeded by
First Sea Lord
1933–1938 		Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded by Minister for Coordination of Defence
1939–1940 		Office abolished
Peerage of the United Kingdom
New creation Baron Chatfield
1937–1967 		Succeeded by
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